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1 Introduction: untangling the impacts of
complex compound crises
A widely learned lesson from history is that
economic crises can have seismic effects on
society and security. This article looks at some of
these from the perspectives of rural and urban
people living in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jamaica,
Kenya and Zambia. It is based on original
research into the global economic crises,
including the food and fuel crises that dominated
2008, and it focuses on the crime and social
cohesion impacts. These include that livelihood
adaptation strategies have left people at or over
the edge of legality, and concerns about youth
criminalisation and the provision of policing and
security. Inter-group and community relations
show signs of strain after economic shocks,
particularly the food price crisis; there are also
signs that community support mechanisms,
including local charity, have faltered under this
strain. The article concludes with some
discussion about the importance of monitoring
the wider social impacts of crisis: the insights
this will provide should not only aid
understanding of how crisis is being experienced
and mediated, but also offer potential insights
into supportive interventions. Crucially, both
crime and social cohesion impacts have
immediate consequences for people’s wellbeing,
as well as the more enduring potential
consequences for economic development,
governance conditions and politics.
1.1 Which crisis? Experiments with people-centred
monitoring in five countries
The research on which this article is based was a
pilot study commissioned by the UK Department
for International Development which aimed to:
(a) provide ‘real-time’ data on the human
impacts of the food, fuel and financial crises and
(b) test an approach to participatory and
qualitative monitoring. Details on country and
site selection, as well as more detail on the
research findings, can be obtained in Hossain et
al. (2009). The research was undertaken in rural
and urban communities, one each in Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya and Zambia, during
February 2009. Methods included a mix of
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qualitative and participatory tools and
techniques such as focus group discussions and
case study research; in most cases, the
researchers had prior relationships with the
community through earlier research. The social
impacts of the crisis were a specific area of focus.
The value of the research was chiefly that it
demonstrated the scope for rapid snapshots of
the experience of economic crisis that would go
beyond and humanise the macroeconomic
statistics that dominate measurement of impact.
In addition, as this article shows, it enables an
exploration of the non-economic dimensions of
economic crisis that quantitative monitoring
methods are unlikely to capture. It also
highlighted the complex nature of the multiple
crises being experienced. Particularly crucial was
that the exploration of experiences of crisis shed
light on how the impacts of the food and fuel
crises were undermining capacities to cope with
the global financial crisis, which in February
2009 was still only beginning to be felt in some
poor developing country communities.
The limitations of the approach are primarily of
scale, and include the constraints to
generalisation due to the qualitative,
community-based approach. The findings are
illustrative rather than representative. In
recognition of these important limitations, the
present article does not claim to represent
conditions in all contexts, but to highlight
processes and routes through which crime and
social cohesion have been affected in the ten
communities in the study, and to indicate
broader lessons about the impact of economic
crisis on crime and social cohesion in developing
country contexts.
A key finding of the research was that even as
the global financial crisis was beginning to strike
developing countries, many communities were
reeling from the effects of the food and fuel
crises. Food prices had not come down
everywhere, nor by enough to bring them down
to pre-2008 levels. The research found that
global crises were being compounded locally by
adverse climate conditions locally (drought in
Kenya and Jamaica, localised flooding in
Indonesia, cyclone and floods in Bangladesh,
heavy rains in Zambia) and difficult political
transitions (post-election violence in Kenya, a
caretaker interregnum in Bangladesh); these
additional factors were contributing to
uncertainty around agricultural production and
local economic decline. Compound, complex
crises were found to be interacting with each
other, making it difficult to disentangle their
impacts on people’s lives.
These local accounts of how the crises were being
experienced offered insights into how the food,
fuel and financial crises were unfolding in poor
developing countries. The situation was different
everywhere, but everywhere were signs of strain.
Many people were trying hard to adapt their
livelihoods. There was support from within
communities, as well as some valued government
and faith-based support. But many people were
reporting not being able to make ends meet:
managing food, health and educational needs
was proving to be a struggle, and not only for the
very poorest; many middle class people were also
reported to be finding the high prices difficult to
cope with. For some, particularly children, there
were impacts that looked set to be irreversible,
because they were dropping out of school to earn
or because their parents could not afford fees,
books, or breakfast. As this article discusses in
more detail, the ties that bind communities
together were showing signs of unravelling, as
people were getting together to save or celebrate
less than they used to. While there was evidence
of neighbourly support, some believed this was
declining. In all five countries, people believe
crime rates have risen. From the worst-hit
communities were reports that children and the
elderly were being abandoned by people no
longer able to cope. In terms of social protection,
people reported that some government
programmes were working well. The most widely
heard complaints included that these covered too
few people with too little support to make a
difference. Other schemes were not reaching the
poorest. And much assistance – including from
religious institutions and NGOs – was considered
to be unpredictable or even to be declining.
2 Crime in a time of crisis
2.1 Livelihoods at the edge of legality
Reports that the economic shock of high food
prices was prompting diversification into new
economic activities were common in all the
communities. In many instances, this involved a
shift into informalisation: traders and food
sellers reported shifting into unbranded or
repackaged goods. This suggests a rise in
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unregulated sales of food items, with
considerable scope for adulteration and
contamination. Poor women in the community in
Dhaka, Bangladesh, had carved out a niche in
sales of rejected vegetables as prices rose and
remained high throughout 2008; this included
selling food items that had been rejected as unfit
for sale, and, reportedly, of items stolen from
wholesale deliveries to markets. In the Kingston
communities in Jamaica, people were reportedly
finding ‘novel ways of hustling’: one strategy
reported was that of ‘goose men’ who accept
sales commissions and then over-charge for the
product, to increase their commission rates.
Men in the rural Kalimantan village in
Indonesia, had responded to the downturn in the
rubber trade on which their livelihoods had
depended by travelling to another island to
engage in illegal gold mining. Having borrowed
funds to finance the travel and mining
equipment costs, they encountered official raids
and some were ultimately driven back to
Kalimantan, having lost more than they had
earned by mining gold. By contrast, in rural
Bangladesh, cross-border smuggling of fertiliser
became highly lucrative at the height of the fuel
prices, when fertiliser costs peaked. Landowners
in the rural community in Naogaon complained
that smuggling had become so common a
livelihood strategy there that agricultural wage
labour rates had been driven up, in response to
the labour shortage that resulted.
In Dhaka, Bangladesh, the unregulated end of
the garments industry was reporting to be
thriving since the start of the global financial
crisis in the final quarter of 2008. This was seen
in the good trade among many small sub-
contractor factories, whom garments workers
claimed were as, if not more numerous than
before, and hiring as many, if not more workers.
These smaller factory units are mainly
sweatshops that do not comply with labour and
social standards of production; workers
complained that these were factories in which
managers ‘misbehave with workers and beat and
abuse them ... They will hire you instantly. But
there is no job security there. After ten days they
may fire you’. In the peri-urban Jakarta
community, the global downturn was also
bringing regulatory weaknesses in the protection
of workers’ rights to the fore; there were reports
that workers who had been laid off were
experiencing difficulties claiming their
entitlements from the labour outsourcing
companies through whom they had been
contracted.
In many communities, people felt that petty
theft was on the rise. In the Jakarta community,
motorcycle and mobile phone theft was reported
to have risen. This was the only community in
which it was possible to triangulate these
findings with reference to official crime
statistics. There, local police confirmed that
there had been a rise in reported crime in the
previous three months (up to February 2009).
While there was a seasonal element to this –
crime rates often rise in the period preceding the
major Eid festival – the police noted that the rise
was over and above seasonal increases. This
suggested that economic crisis was driving rises
in rates of reported crime.
2.2 Substance abuse and antisocial behaviour
Concern was expressed in all the countries about
criminalisation and/or substance abuse among
youth, directly attributed to the pressures of the
crisis. In Kenya this was associated with concerns
about how unmarried youth were being excluded
from relief. Raised levels of drug abuse were
reported in Bangladesh, Jamaica, Zambia, and
Kenya, and rising alcohol abuse was reported in
Zambia, Kenya and Indonesia. In Zambia, young
focus group participants chewed khat throughout
the session. A man in Nairobi said that:
A man in hunger cannot afford leisure. Even if one
drinks beer, it is not for leisure as before, but just to
kill the stress.
Other focus group participants in Nairobi said
that the lethal local brew ‘kill-me-quick’ was
replacing the beer that people used to drink for
leisure. While in some contexts this was seen as
merely an antisocial or wasteful way of coping
with the stress and frustration of coping with
crisis, in Kenya and Jamaica there were concerns
that this was connected to a growing involvement
in the drugs trade among young people in these
communities.
Children and youth becoming involved in
criminal economic activity were also reported.
Again in Nairobi, a headteacher told the
following story of criminalisation among
schoolchildren:
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A copper bell belonging to our school was stolen by one
of the students and sold to a scrap metal dealer at an
industrial area at a cost of KSh20. The bell was very
valuable to the school since it was bought when the
school was first opened. We pursued the issue with the
chief and after investigations we learnt that the boy had
sold it to a middleman who then sold it off to the dealer.
By the time we got to the dealer, the bell had already
been smelted. I received threats from the middleman that
I would be raped should I pursue the issue further.
Children in Nairobi were also reported to be
carrying criminals’ guns for a fee of KSh25.
Girls and young women were said to be
increasingly entering into sex work in Kenya and
Zambia. In Lusaka, youths reported a rising
number of girls and young women entering sex
work as one of the most significant problems
facing their community, caused by poverty and
unemployment, family problems and low income,
and the pressure ‘to look good’. Among the
effects they detailed included HIV/AIDS/STIs,
children being born out of marriage, and school
dropout. In Nairobi, youth had also witnessed a
rise in sex work, involving girls as young as 14, as
well as boys. Teachers in Nairobi attributed the
rising number of schoolgirl pregnancies to
hunger, as girls were believed to have been
exchanging sex for food and snacks. In the
research community, there had been 13
pregnancies in primary schools in 2008, a figure
which teachers felt constituted a rising trend.
2.3 Policing and security
There were some indications that the provision
of policing and security had also been affected by
economic crises in these communities. The
impacts of crisis on the state of policing were
traced most directly in Kingston, where people
had the following to say:
More police are on the road but the police are also
hustling.
I asked one policeman for money and he said ‘when
him done run the road’ [taken bribes from drivers].
More police hustling since the crisis. Dem a di biggest
hustlers, tief and extortionists. Nuff a dem a criminal
who get license to become police. They wear knapsack
and go around collecting.
Over the last year, problems with police have become
worse.
In the Kingston communities there was no
strong sense that that crime rates were rising,
even though people were generally agreed to be
‘hustling’ and ‘going on the juggle’ – finding
ways of earning a living that were not necessarily
within the law. It is possible that this is because
rises in criminal activity are not being felt locally
but involve acts perpetrated in other locations.
Control by powerful ‘dons’ in these Kingston
communities had maintained local order
according to local rules without any inter-group
violence in the previous five months:
Under community rules and regulations, there is to be
no violence against women, no [thieving], no raping,
no disrespect to elders, no telling tales to Babylon, no
homosexuality (though we have it here a lot; all bad
man too). If you are found in the act, you get flogged.
People use sticks and big boots. If two women fight,
they get beaten too.
In the Nairobi community, local security was also
being provided by what appeared to be criminal
gangs. Business owners reported paying a
mandatory daily fee of KSh20 to a group called
the ‘Maasai’ to ensure the security of their
business. That this group was reported to have
prevailed in recent clashes with the feared
mungiki militia group1 gives a sense of the degree
of violence and control exerted on the local
community under study.
The burden of coping with insecurity and
ineffective law and order in poor communities may
be exacerbated by economic crisis, as they add to
financial strains that for some households are
already unbearable. This was brought home in the
case of one Dhaka household which was struggling
to continue fighting a case against their former
landlord who had raped their, then, 13-year-old
daughter the year previously. Her father and uncle
had raised the Tk100,000 (US$1,450 at May 2009
rates) so far needed to fight the legal battle, but in
so doing left the family destitute. They had moved
to the slum in which they were interviewed to cut
expenses, the girl had been removed from school
to try to contribute to the family income by
working, and her mother was now working in a
garment factory; meanwhile her grandmother had
returned to the village to try to raise the money to
keep her younger brother in school. But the food
price crisis had added to an already difficult
financial and law and order situation, and the
future of the legal case was uncertain.
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3 Social cohesion
3.1 Inter-group and community relations
There were incipient signs of social tension
between social groups, most notably in the
Nairobi community. The most tangible signs of
growing tensions emerged in relation to majority
Christian views on a feeding programme for
practising Muslims:
Although we are suffering as youth in [the Nairobi
community], and our parents and friends are
struggling, the Muslims always have food. Every
Friday, the mosque opposite provides food and even
clothing. This support is only for Muslims. We have
been to the mosque a few times dressed in buibui2 like
the other Muslim women and managed to get food. It
seems the people at the Mosque found [out]. We are
told they cannot give food to kafirs. A few weeks back
our friends, young men, were caught dressed in buibui
like women; it was embarrassing, but we must
survive. (FGD participant, Nairobi)
The exclusion of people of other faiths from the
support provided by Muslims seemed to generate
animosity and intense hostility. Some people
argued that when there is support from the
church or government there is no discrimination,
yet Muslims were seen to be encouraging
discrimination, and possibly using food to
convert desperate residents to the Islamic faith.
Also in Nairobi, there were accounts of young
boys being sold to Asian traders for sex in
exchange for food; such reports highlight how
deprivation has heightened awareness of
socioeconomic differences along religious or
ethnic-cultural lines, creating social tensions.
In both the rural Bangladesh and the Jakarta
community, there was a tendency to deny that
minority social groups were disadvantaged
compared with the majority. In both
communities, the impression that was conveyed
was one of social harmony, despite difference.
This may indeed be true under non-crisis
conditions, although what appears to majority
and powerful groups as social harmony may also
be containment of social tension or divisions.3 In
both those communities, there were minority
groups that were disadvantaged with respect to
official social protection schemes. In rural
Bangladesh, the indigenous Shaotal population is
typically excluded from government
programmes, the benefits of which are in the
hands of local government representatives who
seek to maximise political capital from their
distribution. Church- and Christian faith-based
organisations were known to provide some social
services to this group, however. And the Shaotal
population has a political history of mobilisation
around their rights in this part of Bangladesh. In
the Jakarta community of Gandasari, migrant
export sector workers were generally excluded
from the rice for the poor and cash transfer
schemes from which some longer-term residents
benefit. While this was not a community
featuring the exclusion of all migrants – other
non-natives had received considerable help from
local officials and community leaders, including
the right to live on public land – there was a
distinct sense of separation between the
temporary residents and the more permanent
inhabitants. In both rural Bangladesh and
Jakarta, there was ample scope for social
tensions to arise around the distribution of
resources for coping with crisis.
In Bangladesh, Indonesia and Jamaica, there
were also signs that social practices that had
previously cemented the social capital between
groups were declining. The decline of the arisan
or rotating savings scheme in the rural
Indonesian site (see below) also affected
attendance at the yasinan or weekly group
recitation from the Koran, which had been
conducted at the same time, and which was an
important regular social event. Many people said
they no longer attended. To date, however,
community members noted that there had not
been any conflict among the participants, and
there were other signs that a sense of solidarity
within the community was strong; this social
harmony was attributed to a shared reliance on
rubber farming, and fairly strong adherence to
common religious practice. However, as the
impacts of the global financial crisis in the form
of low rubber prices persisted into the fifth
month, people were concerned that the
community’s harmony, mutual understanding
and safety would begin to be affected, and that
practices of giving credit and helping each other
were at risk as the financial situation continued
to worsen.
Changes in social participation were not noted in
the Jakarta site; there, people said they were still
managing to contribute to, for example, funeral
costs, borrowing from family members if
necessary, in order to meet this important social
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obligation. But in rural Bangladesh, people noted
a decrease in the number and scale of major
social events such as weddings or milads (prayer
and sermon sessions to mark anniversaries or
important events). There were fewer such big
occasions now held, fewer people were invited,
and the food was less lavish when they did occur.
Together with the reported decline in private and
informal charity in some contexts, these changes
in social behaviour signal a growing inability to
finance the rituals and practices that bind
societies together.
3.2 Credit
Customary savings and credit groups appear to
have been most important in the rural
Indonesian and both the rural and the urban
Jamaican communities. No such groups were
mentioned as prominent potential or actual
sources of support in either Bangladesh or
Zambia. However, in both rural Indonesia and
Jamaica, these customary modes of rotating
savings and credit appear to have suffered during
the current crisis. The Jamaican practice of
‘throwing partners’ involves a group of like-
minded community members who agree to
collectively save on a regular basis, with an
agreed banker and period of time between
‘draws’. In Kingston, some investors in a financial
services company that had crashed in early 2008
were reported to have invested their partner
money in the company. Other views were that the
practice was struggling during the downturn:
We used to survive by throwing partners. Now, we
don’t have the income to save to throw partners. You
see partner a throw, you have to know where the money
is coming from or else you may start the partner and
can’t maintain it.
The partner thing don’t work well like last time.
Without jobs, it’s impossible.
The view was similar on the other side of the
world in rural Banjar, Indonesia, where arisan
had to date been the main source of capital in
the community. Arisan are customary groups that
bring together between tens and hundreds of
community members, who agree to save a fixed
amount, usually starting at around Rp5,000 each,
which are raffled off weekly. Most community
members are members of an arisan. The weekly
arisan meeting has to date been a major event in
this community, and also involves a yasinan or
Koran recitation. However, recent changes
include the postponement and even the
disbanding of some arisan. In one case, a group
that had only conducted the raffle twice was
terminated, and the winners of the arisan funds
were asked to return the funds. Others have
increased the timetable to once every two or four
months, which seems to be more manageable for
people during a period of financial strain.
3.3 Charity
Informal sources of support, in particular loans
and gifts from neighbours, relatives and local
shops, stalls and food vendors were relied on by
many at the height of the food crisis. Migrant
remittances may also fall into this category of
charitable support, particularly where payments
are occasional support to poor relatives in times
of household crises such as illness or death,
rather than regular payments. However, there
were some findings that indicated that informal
private charity had been hit hard by the crisis.
The experiences of women earning a living as
beggars in rural Bangladesh were indicative;
they reported the following changes since the
crisis: (a) a halving of the amounts of rice they
used to earn regularly by begging;4 (b) a decline
in other charitable gifts (clothes, cash);
(c) competition with other poor and even lower
middle class people over wild foods gleaned from
public and private lands; and, (d) a matter which
greatly offended these women’s sense of personal
dignity, a rise in aggressive and rude responses to
requests for alms. Other people reported that it
was less possible than before to depend on
neighbours and relatives for support, because all
were suffering from the food and fuel crisis. One
reason that informal support may have declined
is that food and fuel prices appear to have hit
middle-class or relatively affluent groups in these
communities fairly hard.
Informal private charity may have been hit
particularly hard because many middle class
people are in formal sector occupations where
cash incomes are relatively fixed over the short
to medium term; by contrast, informal sector
traders, people involved in the extra-legal
economy, and even manual wage labourers in
some sectors have seen their nominal incomes
rise, even if in real terms they remain absolutely
worse off, their decline in purchasing power has
been somewhat less precipitous. Informal charity
appears to be highly elastic, and quick to decline
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when middle class incomes drop. In Bangladesh
women engaged in begging reported that
wealthy people had brushed off their requests for
assistance with reference to government
programmes to which they are, at least in theory,
entitled.
The impacts of crisis on charitable giving were
not all negative, however. Near the Dhaka
community, a charitable feeding programme at
the tomb of a Sufi saint was reported by the
manager to have received more donations at the
time when food prices were at their peak, when
they were feeding some 550 people daily. Most
charitable donors to the tomb are themselves
poor, and the manager speculated that it is
because political and economic crises make
people feel more vulnerable that they depend
more on extra-mundane (spiritual and religious)
means to help them through crises; this is why
donations rise during crises. One pilgrim the
researchers met during the research had brought
a goat as an offering. He was a poor man, like
most of the other two million pilgrims each year.
It had taken him six months to save the money to
pay for the goat, and he had brought it because
he had vowed to sacrifice a goat in return for his
daughter’s recovery from her illness. Donations
from poor people like this pilgrim were reported
to have kept the food service and other charity
activities of the tomb going during the crisis, and
donations had almost doubled over the period
2005–6 to 2007–8.
4 Conclusions: why crime and social cohesion
matter for development
The research discussed above does not claim to
be representative, even of the countries in which
it was conducted. It may not be possible to
generalise about the likelihood that economic
crisis will lead to rising crime and declining
social cohesion in poor communities. However,
the evidence presented here provides credible
illustrations of the routes through which serious
shocks to food security, as occurred throughout
the world in 2008 and continue to occur well into
2009, can result in informalisation and more
seriously, a criminalisation of livelihoods, as well
as undermine the bases and forms of social
connectedness in communities.
There are at least three reasons why the impacts
of economic shock on crime and social cohesion
levels matter centrally to crisis coping and
development prospects in the recovery period.
The first is that levels of crime and social
cohesion are likely to be of central significance
because of their immediate or short-term impacts
on people’s wellbeing. Participatory approaches
to understanding the experience of poverty such
as the Voices of the Poor study have consistently
identified crime and violence as prominent
features of the experience of poverty in its more
multi-dimensional senses, or illbeing.5 Similarly,
it is now widely recognised that livelihood
strategies for adapting to and coping with food
insecurity crises depend more on community-
based support than is typically documented.6
A second reason these broader social impacts
matter is their potential economic and poverty
impacts in the medium term. There are good
reasons to believe that social fragmentation
during protracted economic downturn will have
enduring effects on societal responsibilities for
children, the elderly and the very poor. In the
current crisis, there were signs from Bangladesh
that the local elites who bear customary
responsibility for supporting the very poor were
abandoning those responsibilities, and re-
defining the role of state and NGO programmes
to replace them in those roles. The sense of
uncertainty bred by rising crime is also likely to
have enduring medium-term impacts. In one
particularly telling instance, a farmer in the rural
Kenyan community in the study explained his
hesitation about planting food crops, despite the
high prices he could expect to earn from them:
I have been growing maize, beans and other crops ...
I have been sacrificing a lot in terms of minimising
expenditure in order to buy fuel only to find my crop
stolen from the shamba. This kind of theft was
unheard of in the period before 2007. It has been
brought about by lack of food since those that steal do
it to feed themselves and their families and not for
commercial purposes.
A third reason crime and social cohesion impacts
are likely to be of more enduring significance in
the crisis recovery period is the potential longer-
term impacts on politics and governance
conditions. While reported rising crime rates in
these communities are an insecurity phenomena
of a significantly lower intensity than found in
conditions of conflict and civil war, there are
parallels with the impact of economic shock on
the shift into semi-legal and criminal livelihood
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activities that are worth attending to. In her
analysis of the micro-level factors that shape the
relationship between poverty and violent conflict,
Justino points out that relatively little is known
about how ‘micro-level economic factors and
decisions influence the start of violent conflicts’,
and that strategies for adaptation for survival
may include ‘adopt[ing] forms of livelihoods that
may lead to severe poverty traps but avoid
famine ... or may lead to a life of crime and
violence (or both) (Justino 2009: 3–4).
With Justino’s reminder that we are yet to fully
understand the ‘micro-level economic factors and
decisions’ that influence the start of violent
conflicts, it is worth recalling the political effects
of the current crises so far. The current crisis
(including global food price inflation) has
already witnessed a considerable amount of
political turmoil. While no source for the much-
cited figure that 30 countries had experienced
demonstrations or what are loosely called ‘foot
riots’ since 2008 could be found, a five-minute
internet search found credible references to such
protests in Bangladesh, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Guinea, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Mauritania,
Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique,
Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia,
Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Two West African
countries and Haiti saw governments topple as a
result of the food and/or financial crises in the
last year. In Bangladesh, the siege of barracks
and gruesome massacre of army officers by their
subordinates in February 2009 was initially
explained by frustrations around inadequate pay
in a time of food inflation.
There is little interest in or understanding of
these protests. In the current crisis, food riots
seem to be seen as an automatic, almost
physiological response to acute food insecurity.
See this description of financial crisis ‘contagion’
by a leading New York University economic
forecaster in the blogosphere:
If cargo trade stops, the wheat doesn’t get exported. If
the wheat doesn’t get exported, the mill has nothing to
grind into flour. If there is no flour, the bakeries and
food processors can’t produce bread and pasta and
other foods. If there are no foods shipped from the
bakeries and factories, there are no foods in the shops.
If there are no foods in the shops, people go hungry. If
people go hungry their children go hungry. When
children go hungry, people riot and governments fall.
(Roubini 2008)
But food riots are a political phenomenon, a
barometer of political opinion and capacity to
mobilise. While elite observers often assume that
mass protests of this kind are stirred up by
outside rabble-rousers with their own political
agenda, there are better reasons to believe that
they emerge out of or are informed by a shared
political ideology about the responsibilities of
government or the authorities during episodes of
food crisis.
While it involves a considerable stretch to detect
political and governance impacts of this higher
order in this local evidence of rising crime and
declining social cohesion, it is known that
perceptions of public safety shape attitudes
towards democracy (Fernandez and Kuenzi 2006;
Pérez 2003/4). And there are reasons to believe
that political trust in poor, risk-prone societies
rests considerably on governmental capacities to
support people during crises (Hossain 2008). In
brief, faith in democratic governments can be at
stake during economic crisis. Monitoring the
wider social impacts of economic crisis, with a
particular focus on crime and social cohesion, is
thus about tracking factors that affect poor
people’s immediate, medium- and longer-term
capacities to cope and to live well. The
combination of the potential short-, medium- and
long-run impacts of crime and social cohesion, for
poverty and for politics, suggests these are
important indicators of the development impacts
of economic crisis in poor countries.
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* This article is based on research conducted by
partners, the partners included: Mamunur
Rashid, Bayazid Hasan, Nabil Zuberi and
Sheikh Tariquzzaman of BRAC Development
Institute in Bangladesh; Rizki Fillaili,
Widjajanti I. Suharyo, Bambang Sulaksono,
Hastuti, Herry Widjanarko, Sri Budiyati,
Syaikhu Usman, Nur Aini, and Faisal Fuad
Seiff of the Social Monitoring and Early
Response Unit (SMERU) in Indonesia, Joy
Moncrieffe (IDS), Paulette Griffiths-Jude and
Nellie Richards in Jamaica, Grace Nyonyintono
Lubaale of Mpereeza Associates with Peter
Otienoh Orwa, Elizabeth Kariuki and Maurice
Owino Ligulu in Kenya, and Mwila Mulumbi of
Civil Society for Poverty Reduction, Lusaka and
Wala Mubitana in Zambia.
1 For more details on the mungiki, see The
Economist, ‘Next Machetes, Then
Machineguns?’ 12 March 2009.
2 A garment that covers the head and body worn
by Muslim women; a local variant of the burkah.
3 During focus groups with women in the Jakarta
community the researchers noted a visible
tendency for the discussions to be dominated by
the permanent villagers; migrant worker women
were notably more hesitant and reluctant to
speak. Views on social harmony within the
community, could easily reflect the relative
power of permanent local residents, many of
whom are landlords of migrant workers.
4 In Bangladesh and across parts of South Asia,
begging does not generally attract the level or
type of stigma it does in contemporary
Western societies; for many, giving to beggars
can be a spiritual act which brings religious
blessings. Widows and people with disabilities
may be able to survive on the income from
begging, as had been the case for the group of
beggar women involved in this research.
5 In her review of participatory explorations of
poverty and illbeing, Brock (1999) found that
crime and violence and fear of crime and
violence were significant sources of illbeing for
poor people. The participatory ‘Consultations
with the Poor’ exercise conducted for the World
Development Report 2000/1 also identified crime
as a major source of illbeing for the poor.
However, the final Report contains relatively
little discussion of this point. One advisor to
the participatory research process, Robert
Chambers, noted that while the police had
emerged as an important institution affecting
poor people’s wellbeing, this point had been
excluded from the final report.
6 See Adams (1993); Corbett (1988); Davies and
Hossain (1997).
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